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## CPYRGHT Buried Intelligence

By EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT

WASHINGTON. — Washing-  
is placing practically exclusive  
emphasis on Red China as the  
major outside  
influence in the  
Vietnam war.  
This flies in the  
face of repeat-  
ed avowals by  
the USSR and  
evidence that it  
is providing the  
sinews and the  
brains for what  
it calls the  
"Liberation  
War" in Viet-  
nam.



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In its public releases, our  
State Department either com-  
pletely ignores Soviet Rus-  
sia's massive involvement in  
the war or plays down its sig-  
nificance.

The great extent of Soviet  
aid had been publicly ad-  
mitted by Leonid Brezhnev,  
First Secretary of the Soviet  
Central Committee. He has  
warned that Soviet Russia  
would not allow the United  
States to achieve its goals in  
Vietnam.

In a speech before the ple-  
nary meeting of the Central  
Committee on Sept. 29, 1965, he  
said:

"We have already delivered  
and are delivering to the Dem-  
ocratic Republic of Vietnam,  
a considerable amount of  
weapons and military equip-  
ment. Our policy is to continue  
to deliver it every assistance,  
both material and political,  
which it will need to repulse  
United States aggression."

THE SOVIETS are doing  
just that. Soviet and Czech-  
made anti-aircraft artillery is  
taking a consistently heavy  
toll of American planes flying  
over targets in North Vietnam.  
Soviet bloc ships are unde-  
terred as they consistently  
carry thousands of tons of  
military and paramilitary  
equipment into the port of

The reason Washington is  
playing down Moscow's im-  
portant role in the Vietnam  
war should be obvious. It  
would embarrass our policy  
of "building bridges"— in-  
creasing East - West trade.  
Anthony M. Solomon, Assist-  
ant Secretary of State for  
Economic Affairs, said in  
Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 21, 1965  
that Congress would be  
asked to "examine recom-  
mendations for changes in  
East - West trade policy."  
This implied an increase of  
our trade with the Soviet Un-  
ion and its satellites enabling  
them to increase their mili-  
tary aid to Vietnam.

The official justification for  
this is to be found in what are  
called "National Intelligence  
Estimates." These reflect the  
State Department theory that  
Soviet Russia is "mellowing"  
and is not a threat to United  
States security. An intelligence  
estimate is a judgment re-  
garding the probability of fu-  
ture political and military de-  
velopments of our intelligence  
complex. Periodically, staff  
men on CIA Board of Na-  
tional Estimates produce pa-  
pers intended to evaluate the  
intentions and capabilities of  
Communist countries.

THE PRESIDENT and his  
Cabinet use these as a basis  
for policy formulation, dealing  
with the budget, military re-  
search and development, weap-

ons procurement and the size  
of our military forces. These  
estimates are also largely used  
to set United States policy in  
regard to trade with the So-  
viet bloc.

Since World War II, these  
estimates have provided the  
rationale for export to Moscow  
of supplies and equipment that  
the Soviets vitally need for  
their military build-up. The es-  
timates pictured a Soviet bloc  
capable of meeting the bulk of  
its requirements.

In 1954, distorted Intelli-

gence estimates were used  
to justify deleting or down-  
grading some 77 categories  
of machine tools from the  
Battle Act list which barred  
their shipment behind the  
Iron Curtain. According to  
the Senate Internal Security  
Subcommittee, Robert Am-  
ory Jr., the CIA's former  
Deputy Director for Intelli-  
gence Production, said his  
agency accepted the accu-  
racy of Soviet production  
figures for machine tools.  
Yet Soviet statistics are no  
toriously misleading and  
wholly unreliable, a fact fre-  
quently admitted by Soviet  
officials. Amory's unbeliev-  
able statement can be found  
on pages 303 and 307 of the  
Subcommittee hearing en-  
titled "Export of Strategic  
Materials to the USSR and  
Other Soviet Bloc Countries,"  
Part 2, Oct. 24, 1961.

Our Government's inflated  
evaluation of the Soviet econ-  
omy became so widely known  
that it was finally contradicted  
by the CIA in its unprecedent-  
edly published report of Jan.  
8, 1962, and by a State De-  
partment report last Septem-  
ber. By that time, as usual,  
the damage had already been  
done. For nearly a decade,  
critical intelligence facts point-  
ing to glaring gaps in the So-  
viet economy were either over-  
looked or deliberately ignored.

from exploiting what could  
have been crippling weak-  
nesses in the USSR's capacity  
for fostering "liberation  
wars." At the same time, we  
set the example for England  
and others of our allies to fur-  
nish the items the Reds criti-  
cally needed on the grounds  
that these were not strategic  
any longer since the Soviets  
were capable of manufactur-  
ing them anyway.

Today Amory is no longer  
in Government. This is irrele-  
vant. The same small group of  
faceless scribes is directing  
the drive for more East-West  
trade, dovetailing into Mos-  
cow's propaganda campaign  
with the same objective.  
Among these officials is a pro-  
tege of Amory, Francis Bator,  
formerly a staff member of  
the National Security Council  
and currently on the staff of  
McGeorge Bundy, top presi-  
dential adviser for National Secu-  
rity Affairs.

Some time ago, the Admin-  
istration sent an official trade  
mission to Rumania and Pol-  
and. This writer has seen  
some half a dozen letters  
from businessmen who claim  
that the State Department  
urged them to participate in  
a trade mission with the So-  
viet Union on the grounds that  
"it is in the interest of the  
United States Government."  
Of course, this facilitates Mos-  
cow's aid to Hanoi.

THUS, WE WERE prevented